State-Building Interventions and their Impact on Formal and Informal Institutions: Paradox of Contestation and Cooperation in Post-2001 Afghanistan

Abstract

Taking post-2001Afghanistan as a case study, this article looks at the impact of state-building interventions on formal and informal institutions in a post-conflict state. Efforts to reconstruct Afghanistan after international intervention in 2001 remain under-researched in terms of studying the problematic interplay of contestation and collaboration between formal and informal institutions and its complex linkages with desired statebuilding goals. Notwithstanding the dominance of local, informal and traditional governance structures, attempts at introducing formal, centralist and top-down institutions have generally disregarded the social context of institutional success. As a consequence, adherence to formal practices is low, raising issues of legitimacy and effectiveness of state-building practices. The interplay between informal and the formal, in which de facto and de jure try to influence each other, show complex patterns of contestation when goals are non-complementary or dysfunctional; and cooperation when such goals are complementary and functional. In Afghanistan, such paradoxical interplay has been demonstrated in examples such as the formal engagement with community-based policing structures (Arbakai), customary dispute resolution bodies (Jirgas) and tribal (Qawm) elder‟s role in state-related functions. This interaction does not show linear lines of either cooperation or contestation; rather a complex mix of both, sometimes in the same domain. The varied attempts made by the state as well as international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) in engaging informal institutions for successful governance practices illustrate that bottom-up processes need to be engaged for increasing the effectiveness of formal institution building.