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dc.contributor.authorAbbasi, Ajmal-
dc.contributor.authorKhan, Dr Raja Muhammad-
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-07T11:27:10Z-
dc.date.available2019-11-07T11:27:10Z-
dc.date.issued2016-
dc.identifier.urihttp://142.54.178.187:9060/xmlui/handle/123456789/1031-
dc.description.abstractStability in Afghanistan is inextricably linked with a negotiated peace settlement. Notwithstanding broad consensus about the essence of political negotiations to end the Afghan conundrum, internal and external stakeholders have been pursuing fluctuating strategies. The terminology of „reconciliation‟ has often been viewed disparately by various actors. Consequently, the entire peace process in the country has remained shrouded in suspicion. This article aims at identifying the strategic policy discrepancies among the key national, regional and international players and suggests a workable way forward.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherIPRI Journalen_US
dc.subjectTalibanen_US
dc.subjectU.S. Roleen_US
dc.subjectStrategic Differencesen_US
dc.subjectPeace Processen_US
dc.subjectAfghanistanen_US
dc.subjectSocial Sciencesen_US
dc.titleThe Afghan Peace Process: Strategic Policy Contradictions and Lacunasen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
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