AN ANALYSIS OF INDIAN, RUSSIAN & US RESPONSES TO CHINA PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR

Abstract

Every state adopts a policy in response to an issue or in reaction to other state’s policy. But when two states come up with a divert policy responses to the same issue, it raises many questions in the academic and intellectual community. The aim of the study is to inquire why two or more states adopt different policy responses to a similar issue. In specific, the study tried to investigate the policy responses of India, Russia and America towards CPEC. Additionally, the study is designed to answer what are the differences in their policy responses and why. Lastly, the study also probes into their channels or sources through they are communicating their policy responses over CPEC. Factor analysis method was used for answering the research questions to explore the level of variations in the policy responses of India, Russia and America to CPEC. To support the study from theoretical perspective, Decision Making Theory, articulated in the Schematic Model, was applied. In its methodology, the research designed to thoroughly analyze CPEC by investigating its origin, rationale, interests of Beijing and Islamabad, short and long term planning, challenges and opportunities and its political, economic and strategic implications for both the Iron Brothers and for the regions including, South Asia, Middle East and Central Asia. Secondly, a comparative analysis of rationale and sources of Indian, Russian and American policy responses over CPEC have been presented. It was found that the diversity in the policy responses of India, Russia and USA to CPEC shaped by multiple internal and external factors. The three states have different interests in China and Pakistan and their joint project, CPEC. For New Delhi, both states are rival and hostile since its inception and CPEC is the question of their security and integrity. For Moscow, China is a strategic partner while Pakistan is a new emerging ally in South Asia while CPEC is just another opportunity and a trade corridor that connects Eurasian region with the rest of the World. For Washington, China an economic rival that has challenged US hegemony across the globe; while Pakistan is a trustless ally throughout the Cold War and post 9/11. America considers CPEC as part of Beijing OBOR initiative and does not welcome it as it undermines its economic and strategic interests in the regions of SA, CARs and Middle East. Keeping in mind the theoretical questions, the study found that the spectrum of factors shaping the responses of the three countries are; political structure, political culture, diversity in traditions, norms and values, priorities, perception of threats, differences in capacity and skills of policy makers, political and economic dependency, geographic position, choice and time, idiosyncratic factor, leadership skills and the capacity of policy makers and their decision-making dexterity. In response to the policy responses of New Delhi, Moscow and Washington to CPEC, it was found that for India, CPEC is the issue of sovereignty as the project passes through GB which New Delhi claims an integral part of Jammu and Kashmir. Moscow’s response to CPEC is mixed, as on the one hand Moscow did not join the project but on the other hand it supported the idea of integration that ultimately supports Russian Eurasian vision. Washington response to CPEC was initialy ambiguous, but the new administration came up with a clear message and rejected both OBOR; and CPEC on the grounds of Indian rationales. From rationales and sources analysis, the study found, New Delhi never miss any platform at global, regional and national level where it could voice their response to CPEC, thus, adopting a rigid stance against both China and Pakistan about the construction of CPEC and its implications. Russia mostly used state run official sources of communications to come up with a response to CPEC through electronic and print media to count its soften attitude and balance approach. The US issues its official stance through the offices of Sectary of State, Defense Sectary and White House to show their concerns about the Chinese OBOR and, specifically, CPEC.