Nuclear Deterrence and Conflict Management Between India and Pakistan

Abstract

situation. Increased military force differential, economic disparity and the international acceptability of India as a future power in the decades to come are some of the factors that may help India feel emboldened to implement its own agenda of peace in the region. The central argument of this research is that the possibility of another military engagement between India and Pakistan exists, with varying degrees of probability, thus challenging the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. Until the probabilities of military engagements are minimized, the possibilities of peace and stability in the region would remain elusive, meaning by peace in South Asia is possible, only if the probabilities of military engagement between India and Pakistan are minimized. Therefore, the situation needs scholarly attention, perhaps under a new paradigm in which the two nuclear neighbours voluntarily agree to resolve their disputes instead of just managing them, to avoid recurrence of violent conflicts and hence an unthinkable nuclear war.